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1. Johansson’s approach to Neanderthal language 
 
Sverker Johansson provided a very useful piece of work in which he skillfully 
reviews most aspects and scientific areas that have dealt with the Neanderthal 
language issue, including (but not limited to) genetics, archaeology, linguistics 
and modeling. Johansson’s main conclusion is that Homo neanderthalensis had 
some form of language, at the very least, a proto-language, which he understands 
as “a system possessing lexical semantics but not syntax” (Johansson 2013: 6). At 
the same time, he notes that many aspects are still obscure, and that the data re-
ported until now is still not conclusive. In particular, “whether they had syntactic 
language can be neither confirmed nor refuted” (p. 23). 
 We agree with Johansson when he says that Neanderthals had to count on 
some form of language. The amount of evidence he has reviewed points in this 
direction without doubt. We also agree with him in conceding Neanderthals a 
much more sophisticated capacity for oral production than as sometimes been 
depicted in the past. Nevertheless, we think that the real, productive debate is 
whether or not Neanderthals had the same faculty of language that anatomically 
modern humans (henceforth, AMHs) have. The author distances himself from 
this debate and, at the end, he does not take a stance. According to Johansson, the 
main reasons for not taking any clear position in this regard are related to an 
inherent problem of the sources of evidence and of the methodology: 
 
(A) The data are few and not always trustworthy. 
(B) Some conclusions imply difficult, even illicit inferential steps from the data. 
 
Our criticism to Johansson’s position is double. First, although we entirely agree 
with Johansson regarding the additional difficulty incorporated by an extinct 
species, we think that we actually can proceed with a null hypothesis: In our 
opinion, current evidence supports that the Neanderthal language was not like 
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AMH’s because it lacked modern syntax (and only because of this). This is a plau-
sible conclusion that can be reached from the very data reviewed by Johansson. 
Second, some aspects of Johansson’s approach, both related to the evidence and 
the methodology need to be improved. Plausibly, it is this circumstance that 
hinders him from reaching any firm conclusion about this issue. 
 
2. Some remarks on (the interpretation of) evidence  
2.1. The nature of language  
Johansson’s definition of language is as follows: “Language is a symbolic com-
munication system that is not fixed; extensibility is an integral part of the system. 
This amounts to the presence of something like lexical semantics, flexibly and 
learnably mapping forms to meanings” (Johansson 2013: 6). He further states that 
“a system that has units that are combined in syntax-like patterns, but that lacks 
a mapping to meanings, such as birdsong, is likewise not language. A system 
possessing lexical semantics but not syntax, I would call a protolanguage” (p. 6). 
Johansson has pointed out that lexical semantics is something one could attribute 
to Neanderthals. In turn, “there is no real evidence one way or the other concern-
ing syntactic abilities [among them] […]. This means that Neanderthals had at 
least a spoken proto-language; whether they had syntactic language can be 
neither confirmed nor refuted” (p. 23).  
 Consequently, Johansson has focused his attention on (1) lexical semantics as 
the core property with which language (or protolanguage) is endowed; (2) syntax 
as the property that distinguishes protolanguages from modern language; and (3) 
communication as the function that language fulfills (and plausibly evolved for). 
All these assumptions can be eventually problematic, particularly if some of 
these concepts are used loosely, as sometimes seems to be the case.  
 For instance, lexical semantics in frameworks like Hale & Keyser’s (1995), 
Mateu’s (2002), Borer’s (2005a, 2005b), or Acedo’s (2010) does not separate syntax 
from the meaning of the lexicon. It is still an important open debate whether lexi-
cal items are or can be detachable from syntax. 
 Moreover, exactly what does extensibility (or even “flexibly and learnably 
mapping forms to meanings”) mean or imply? And what is the ultimate source of 
such extensibility or flexibility? After all, semantic extension allows for such 
expansion of meaning and for flexibly mapping forms to (new) meanings. How-
ever, this ability has been attested in great apes reared in captivity (Gardner et al. 
1989; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998). The other 
source of semantic extensibility is, crucially, that of semantic compositionality. 
But this kind of compositionality relies heavily on syntax: new meanings emerge 
when the same words are combined in a different fashion. 
 Additionally, it is important to always make clear in which case one is 
referring to modern, complex syntax, or instead is using the term syntax loosely 
(perhaps in the etymological sense of ‘to put in order’ or even ‘to arrange’). For 
example, Johansson’s dismissal of Piattelli-Palmarini’s rejection of a language 
without syntax obviates that Piattelli-Palmarini is referring to the former type. 
More importantly, different kinds of grammars have been actually hypothesized 
within the very Chomskyan paradigm. Syntax is not an all-or-nothing question 
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within this framework. But neither is it a continuum.1 Ultimately, when we look 
at “animal communication” through a “syntactic” lens, we actually find “gram-
mar” among extant species (see Hurford 2011: 3–99). Hence, ape strings of lexi-
grams or signs, such as those performed by Washoe, Kanzi, or Sarah, were not 
syntax-free. On the contrary, they are the output of a system that can be des-
cribed by means of a regular grammar. Allegedly, some species (such as Gent-
ner’s et al. 2006 starlings) might have access to recursive grammars, though once 
again in experimental conditions only.2 Perhaps all hominin proto-languages 
were the output of systems akin to regular grammars (such as apes’ ‘languages’) 
or perhaps to recursive grammars. In fact, it is our contention that the available 
data do not support non-AMH hominin ‘languages’ being syntactically struc-
tured like AMH languages are. 
 On another front, Johansson argues that Pirahã (if it actually lacked recur-
sion) or pidgins are functional communication systems with lexical and proposi-
tional semantics. He further states that, although they “lack one or more compo-
nents of full modern human language […], these systems also deserve the label 
‘language’” (p. 6). This can plausibly be the case, according to his own characteri-
zation of language (see above). But once again, this entails placing structurally dif-
ferent linguistic objects under the cover term of language, obviating the fact that 
they rely on grammars endowed with different (formal) properties. In the end, 
one always can argue that the string of symbols productively generated by Wa-
shoe or Sarah were also endowed with lexical and propositional semantics, and 
allowed them to communicate with their caregivers. The suppression of bounda-
ries between systems (i.e. gradualism) places apes’ performance in an ambiguous 
position, becoming able to be classified under the pidgin umbrella as well. Notice 
also that, behind a pidgin there is always an AMH brain. A pidgin is never 
entirely independent from the influence of a prototypical, non-simplified/ 
reduced adult language (these systems have been simplified by adult AMHs who 
already spoke a full modern language). Ultimately, it seems to us that what is 
really worth characterizing is the proto-typical AMH language, and then to de-
termine whether or not Neanderthals could have developed something like this. 
                                                
    1 In fact, Johansson mentions the controversy about a partial Merge, and specifically about a 
gradual evolution of Merge with precursor stages. However, fifty years earlier, Noam 
Chomsky himself postulated as well different classes of grammars according to the type of 
set of strings of symbols (= formal languages) that can be generated under certain general 
admissibility conditions (Chomsky 1956, 1959). Cross-serial dependencies (i.e. dependencies 
among nodes in a hierarchy that are not expressible as hierarchical nodes) suggest that 
natural languages could be characterized as Type 1, or context-sensitive languages within 
his hierarchy. Nonetheless, both Type 2 (context-free) and Type 3 (regular) grammars were 
also hypothesized to exist. Notice that context-free grammars are also able to generate sets 
of strings recursively. Eventually, regular grammars generate strings of symbols as well, 
although they are arranged in a linear fashion without any internal structuring. Currently, 
different subtypes of both regular grammars (‘first-order Markov grammars’ and ‘state 
chain grammars’), and context-sensitive grammars (‘mildly context-sensitive’ and ‘context 
sensitive [stricto sensu])’) are postulated. It is true that formal grammars could not properly 
apprehend the complexities inherent to natural languages (Pullum & Rogers 2011), but they 
help to understand some of their basic properties. As a consequence, it seems justified to 
rely on them to gain a clearer insight on some basic properties of hominin [proto] languages. 
    2 This is a well-known open debate. See Gentner et al. (2006), van Heijningen et al. (2009), or 
Berwick et al. (2011). 
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 Lastly, one should avoid conflating language with one of the functions it ful-
fills, namely communication. As discussed above, different types of (formal) lang-
uages (including proto-languages), all endowed with lexical and propositional 
semantics, can effectively function as communication devices. As a consequence, 
it is the structural properties of languages that matter — and, more specifically, 
how linguistic structures are generated. In fact, modern biology heavily supports 
this view, given that only biological structures along with their activities evolve, 
but not functions (see Love 2007 for discussion).3 This clarification is important 
also for correctly addressing the form-function problem that Johansson has repeat-
edly come into and has extensively reviewed. Admittedly, modern functions 
cannot be automatically inferred from human-like, language-related biological 
structures (the descended larynx, the mirror neurons, etc.). Conversely, modern 
functions can exist even if some human-like, language-related biological struc-
ture is absent (e.g., sign languages and speech-hearing organs). Nonetheless, bio-
logical structures do exhibit a measurable degree of evolutionary continuity that 
allows making justified inferences from them regarding language evolution.4 
 
2.2. The substratum of the language faculty: Neural connections and the brain 
 
We completely agree with the way in which Johansson has reviewed the fossil 
evidence of speech and hearing organs. However, we have some concerns regar-
ding the way in which he has discussed the neuronal substrate of language. Con-
cerning the neural wiring, Johansson only mentions nerves that control tongue 
movements and breathing, plausibly because some of their properties can be 
confidently inferred from the fossilized nerve canals. But this is informative only 
with regard to speech. Although brain nerve tracts do not fossilize, we are not 
here in total darkness. For instance, as brains become larger, structural changes in 
the form of internal reorganization do occur. Typically, we observe a connec-
tional invasion of disjointed areas, thus plausibly allowing different cognitive 
systems to interface. Brain allometry is another interesting source of evidence. 
Different brain morphologies plausibly imply different brain interconnection 
patterns. Whereas Neanderthal and AMH skulls (and brains) are quite similar at 
birth, they differ progressively across development (Gunz et al. 2010, 2012). 
Importantly, it is after birth when essential changes in the wiring of the brain 
take place under the influence of environment and, when fully functional, 
                                                
    3 According to Love (2007), functions can be construed as the uses given to biological struc-
tures because of their connections with other structures, but also because of the relation-
ships existing between the organism and the environment.  
    4 For instance, we have contended elsewhere (Balari et al. 2011) that the Chomsky Hierarchy 
has a neurobiological correlate that can illuminate how human language evolved. Hence, 
the automaton in the Chomsky Hierarchy equates with a computational device relying on a 
pattern generator (or sequencer) and a memory ‘stack’. Simply put, more memory resources 
allow the automaton to generate more complex structures. Following Lieberman (2000) or 
Ullman (2001), a plausible neural substrate for the sequencer is the basal ganglia (see section 
2.5). Working memory plausibly relies on the activity performed by diverse cortical 
structures. Our point was, then, that the evolutionary trajectory of this computational device 
is more informative regarding the evolution of language than that of the functions it fulfills 
or of the functions fulfilled by language (communication, symbolic behavior, modern beha-
vior, and the like). 
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computational devices eventually appear (Balaban 2006; Ramus 2006; Petanjek et 
al. 2011). For instance, according to Boeckx (2012), it is the more globular 
configuration of adult AMH brains that allowed modern syntax to emerge. Such 
a configuration would offer the possibility of more efficient connections and 
information exchanges and, eventually, of computational efficiency. In sum, the 
different skull developmental trajectories plausibly do reflect real differences 
between these two hominins at the neurobiological level. 
 On the other hand, we consider that the importance given by Johansson to 
lateralization should be reduced. There is only a weak correlation in our species 
between general verbal skill and precociousness of language development on the 
one hand, and the degree of lateralization in hand use, on the other — in general, 
between lateralization and cognitive abilities, including language (Nettle 2003). 
Additionally, language seems not to depend so much on a specific pattern of 
structural and functional lateralization of the brain, but on specific inter-
connections between neuronal populations that link them functionally. For 
instance, language integrity is not substantially affected, either qualitatively 
(patterns or types of linguistic structures) or quantitatively (number of utter-
ances, size of the lexicon, etc.) when language is transferred to the right hemi-
sphere in some pathological conditions or in some left-handed people (Liégeois et 
al. 2008). Moreover, at the genetic level, Lambert et al. (2011), in their study of the 
expression of genes in human fetal cerebral cortex, have found no significant 
differences in gene expression patterns between left and right neurons from 
Broca and Wernicke language areas.5 Lastly, fossil evidence of brain structural 
and functional asymmetries predates the evidence for (modern) right-handed-
ness among hominins (Kyriacou & Bruner 2011). In fact, functional (or even 
structural) brain lateralization is an archaic feature among mammals.6 
 
2.3. On the role of genes, the environment and development 
 
We have some major concerns regarding the way in which Johansson reviews the 
genetic evidence. 
 First, it is true that “there is no such thing as the gene for a complex trait” 
(Johansson 2013: 16). However, this does not automatically preclude that a 
“single genetic change conferr[ed] language” (p. 15). This mutation can affect a 
master or hub gene (see for example, Seo et al. 2009). These genes establish 
connections with many other elements in the genome/proteome. A single 
mutation or change will plausibly affect the relations with the rest of elements 
within its interactome,7 thus provoking many downstream changes. More 
importantly, when one speculates about the mutation that yielded language (e.g., 
Chomsky, cited by the author [p. 16]), one does not normally think about a 
                                                
    5 Importantly, they also concluded that “cortical evolution in different mammalian species 
may be driven in part by species-specific changes in the regulation of the same genes and 
pathways, which are potentially important in brain patterning in many species” (Lambert et 
al. 2011: 10). 
    6 Proven in gorillas and chimps (Cantalupo & Hopkins 2001; Hopkins & Cantalupo 2004; 
Hopkins et al. 2007), but also in many other vertebrates (Rogers 1989). 
    7 That is, the whole set of molecular interactions in cells. Genome: the whole set of genes; 
proteome: the whole set of proteins. 
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mutation that gave rise to all components of language from scratch. This muta-
tion could just help to functionally interconnect the diverse, previously evolved, 
elements of language. Or it could just optimize some specific component (such as 
syntax?) that was already connected to all the remaining, important-for-language 
pieces? For more on this, see section 4 below. 
 Another aspect that should not cause confusion is that of the function of a 
gene. In fact, this is related to the dual sense that function has in biology (see also 
section 2.1). Hence, it is true that FOXP2 has a very well preserved expression 
pattern and plays practically the same physiological role in all mammals (and 
perhaps in all vertebrates). Nonetheless, this does not preclude that the brain 
circuitry FOXP2 contributes to fulfill different functions in different organisms — 
i.e. support different behaviors like ultrasound generation, song learning and 
performance, or language. The possibility that this gene contributed to a different 
function in Neanderthals is neither implausible nor non-parsimonious (e.g., 
vocalizations related to some musical behavior, as suggested by Mithen 2006). 
 In the third place, the differences between Neanderthals and AMHs at the 
genetic level are real. There are differences in genes involved in brain develop-
ment and, more significantly, in genes related to language disorders. For 
instance, Neanderthals exhibit the ancestral allele in some positions of the gene 
MCPH1, which controls neuronal proliferation and whose mutation gives rise to 
microcephaly (Green et al. 2010). A similar case is the gene CNTNAP2, one of 
FOXP2 targets and a candidate for specific language impairment and autism. 
This gene shows a fixed single nucleotide change in Denisovans, the closest 
hominin to Neanderthals (Meyer et al. 2012). Finally, Maricic et al. (2013) found an 
AMH-specific substitution within a regulatory region of FOXP2 that is likely to 
alter its expression.  
 Furthermore, it seems to us that Johansson has, to some extent, 
oversimplified the role of genes in relation to the environment and in develop-
ment. He wisely takes into account West-Eberhard’s (2003) book. However, it is 
West-Eberhard who has shown us that the same genotype can develop different 
phenotypes in different environments. Neanderthals and AMHs actually evolved 
and lived in different environments (Finlayson 2005; Carrión et al. 2011). Conse-
quently, even if they were endowed with the same ‘linguistic genotype’ (though, 
remember, this is not the case), we cannot automatically rule out the possibility 
that the former had a different faculty of language. In fact, as we pointed out 
above, it has been recently proved that their skull ontogenies (and, hence, brain 
development) diverge at some point after birth. Ultimately, evolutionary 
innovations can arise in the absence of genetic modifications (i.e. in neutral 
conditions) because of the very dynamics and generative properties of 
developmental systems (Müller & Newman 2005; West-Eberhard 2005). These 
considerations substantially minimize the role of genes both in development and 
evolution. 
 Last but not least (and related to our latter concern), genes are less impor-
tant during the last steps of development, when the definitive wiring of the brain 
takes place and cognitive abilities finally emerge in response to environmental 
stimuli.  
 
Biolinguistics    Forum   
 
205 
2.4. Effects of introgression 
 
In section 5 of his article, Johansson rightly distinguishes between hybridization 
and introgression. Introgression is a case of partial hybridization between species; 
it is “an invasion of the genome”, in Mallet’s (2005) terms, something that hap-
pens quite often in nature, and therefore it is not an anomaly (Mallet 2008); with-
in European mammals, 10% hybridize. Mallet observes that “introgression can be 
highly selective, affecting only some parts of the genome, whereas other genomic 
regions strongly affected by divergent selection remain virtually isolated” (Mallet 
2005: 6; our emphasis). Neanderthals and AMHs interbred.8 But so did Deniso-
vans and AMHs (Meyer et al. 2012).  
 Interestingly, Johansson concludes that “evidence of successful inter-
breeding would […] add some modest weight to the case for Neanderthal lang-
uage […] But it is not clear what form of language is supported”. In essence, his 
argument goes as follows:  
 
(1)  Neanderthals could not be reproductively successful (within an AMH re-
productive group) if they had lacked language. 
(2)  Therefore, they most likely had “a functioning language faculty” (Johans-
son 2013: 17). 
(3)  “A genetic endowment heterozygous9 for the relevant genes [was] suffici-
ent [for language]” (idem) — perhaps with the exception of FOXP2.  
 
 Notice, however, that: 
 
(A) Communication was not out of range of Neanderthals, and a proto-lang-
uage should have been sufficient for communication. 
(B) Hence, one cannot take for granted that Neanderthals automatically had 
full language. Mallet’s words caution against quick conclusions. This is im-
portant if we take into account the differences in development (see sections 
2.2 and 2.3 above). 
(C) Certainly, an AMH interacting with other AHMs by means of a pidginized 
version of the group language (or of her own language) resembles the 
scenario posited by Johansson quite closely. However, we do not derive 
from this that they are endowed with a different faculty of language or that 
there are cognitive differences between them. 
(D) FOXP2 is perhaps more the rule than the exception concerning the effect of 
heterozygosity on language abilities. In fact, many cognitive disorders in 
which language is impaired are caused by changes in gene dosage. For 
                                                
    8 Johansson says that Africans do not have Neanderthal genes. This is technically inaccurate 
(Green et al. 2010 say Sub-Saharians), though we attribute this generalization to the recency 
of the paper published by Sánchez-Quinto et al. (2012), who show that North-Africans do 
have Neanderthal genes. 
    9 That is, endowed with different alleles of the same gene; in this case, with only one copy of 
the language-ready genome. 
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instance, the duplication of a small fragment within the chromosomal 
region 7q11.23 gives rise to a mild to severe language impairment (Somer-
ville et al. 2005; Berg et al. 2007). Conversely, language is more preserved 
(but still disordered) in hemizygotic people — the disease is known as 
Williams-Beuren syndrome —, while the visuo-spatial abilities are substan-
tially impaired (Mervis & Becerra 2007; Martens et al. 2008). 
 
 However, our main criticism against any relevant role of the interbreeding 
fact in granting Neanderthals a modern faculty of language is of quite a different 
nature. For the sake of argument, we will leave aside the circumstance that 
current DNA analyses have only proved a gene flow from Neanderthals to 
AMHs, but not vice versa (Green et al. 2010). Obviously, we will obviate as well 
that evidence of modern language in Neanderthals is at least controversial, as 
Johansson himself discusses. To begin with, it seems that the introgression event 
did not prompt any significant cultural change among Neanderthals, in spite of 
the role commonly granted to (modern) language in dynamizing cultures. Hence, 
according to Green et al. (2010), the admixture took place ≈ 50–100kya BP, but the 
Châtelperronian and other modern-like techno-complexes only emerged ≈ 40kya 
BP (d’Errico et al. 1998; Langley et al. 2008).10 Moreover, the introgressed DNA 
should have contained all the AMH-specific variants of the ‘language genes’ and 
of the corresponding regulatory mechanisms of gene expression. Importantly, 
these genes are scattered throughout the genome (Smith 2007; Benítez-Burraco 
2012). However, we have direct evidence that Neanderthals exhibit the ancestral 
alleles in some cases (see above). Finally, if we could attest that the introgression 
event actually provided Neanderthals with the whole AMH-specific molecular 
machinery needed for language, an AMH faculty of language can still not be 
taken for granted. As we discussed at the end of the previous section, there is no 
direct link between the genotype and the phenotype. 
 
2.5. Archaeological evidence 
 
As he did before with other sources of data, Johansson has proficiently reviewed 
the extant evidence of symbolism and of ‘modern behavior’ among Neander-
thals. However, we think that his analysis would benefit from a change of focus. 
To begin with, it is not symbolism or symbolic behavior per se which is at stake. 
From a semiotic perspective, human languages are certainly ‘codes’. But natural 
languages are more than codes. As we discussed in section 2.1, linguistic 
meaning is compositional by nature (see also Hurford 2011). Modern, human-like 
language is a system of representation (and ultimately, of communication) that 
combines symbols — both hierarchically and recursively — to generate complex 
structures that include different sorts of dependencies between distal constitu-
ents (Chomsky 1965, 1980; Baker 2001; Hauser et al. 2002). What matters in our 
opinion is, above all, how linguistic structures are generated. Moreover, even if 
we found evidence of a symbolic culture among Neanderthals, we could not 
                                                
    10 Some authors (e.g., Bar-Yosef & Bordes 2010) even cast serious doubts on a possible Nean-
derthal authorship of the Châtelperronian industry. 
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automatically infer that they were endowed with a modern faculty of language. 
Symbolic cultures are opaque by nature (Eco 1976), whereas linguistic meaning is 
open, productive by nature. Ultimately, as we have already argued, other extant 
primates can learn and use symbols (Premack 1971; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; 
Gardner et al. 1989; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994).  
 Conversely, Johansson has just taken a quick look at archaeological evi-
dence of syntax as originally posited by Uriagereka & Camps (2006). Johansson 
merely points out that these pieces of evidence are considered controversial or 
uninformative, according to some other authors (e.g., Lobina 2012). However, 
two lines of evidence suggest that this piece could be more informative than cur-
rently assumed:  
 First, under this fresh hypothesis, the computational system of language is 
thought to be functionally unspecific by nature. The functions to which it contri-
butes depend on the systems with which it interfaces.11 In fact, this is what ulti-
mately qualifies knots as a proxy for syntactic abilities (Barceló-Coblijn & Gomila 
2012). Motor behavior will help us to prove this: 
 
    • The field of motor disorders is familiar with the idea that voluntary motor 
actions are decomposable into motor primitives or ‘movemes’ (Del Vecchio 
et al. 2003). Movemes combine in diverse fashions according to specific 
combinatorial or syntactic rules (Flash & Hochner 2005). Moreover, the 
brain seems to rely on basic neural ‘binding mechanisms’ (like cortical 
synfire chains) to generate any kind of composite objects at the represen-
tational level. As Flash & Hochner also remark, “activities in synfire chains 
might bind and form a hierarchy of representations as required for lang-
uage, [but] they might also offer a unique neural mechanism for compositi-
onality of motor elements” (p. 663). 
    • There is also ample evidence suggesting that movements are controlled by 
a ‘central’ device, with peripheral, biomechanical factors playing a subsi-
diary role (Dipietro et al. 2009). fMRI studies suggest that motor processing 
activates cortical and subcortical areas that greatly match those involved in 
language processing. Significantly, the signal of two relevant components 
of that network (the bilateral ventral premotor area and the right posterior 
inferior temporal cortex) is transmitted via the arcuate fasciculus, which 
also plays a relevant role in language processing (see Makuuchi 2010 for a 
review). 
    • Lastly, there is ample evidence as well of the comorbidity between motor 
and language disorders. In most cases, this is due to the affectedness of the 
same specific brain areas, which probably perform some basic computation 
relevant for both language and motor planning. For instance, specific 
language impairment positively correlates with fine and gross motor 
deficits affecting limb movements (but not with rhythmic timing skills) 
(Zelaznik & Goffman 2010). In the same vein, dyslexia can be comorbid 
with drawing deficits. It has been argued that dyslexics suffer from a visuo-
                                                
    11 This idea goes back to the seminal paper by Hauser et al. (2002). 
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constructive deficit (Eden et al. 2003; Lipowska et al. 2011). Probably, they 
specifically suffer from a deficit in the rule abstraction mechanism inherent 
to sequential learning, which can simultaneously impair visuo-motor and 
linguistic tasks.12 Similarly, Huntington disease is a neurodegenerative con-
dition caused by the atrophy of the basal ganglia.13 In this condition, both 
linguistic and motor deficits are observed (Teichmann et al. 2005; 2008; Ro-
bins Wahlin et al. 2010). Interestingly, knock-in mice expressing the human 
pathogenic HD gene exhibit abnormal prefrontal and cortico-striatal 
functions, which impair rule learning abilities, and ultimately, give rise 
both to visuo-spatial and motor deficits (Trueman et al. 2009). 
 
 A second line of evidence supporting the knotting hypothesis is that of 
cultural dynamism among hominins, which we have introduced in section 2.4. 
Contrary to the emergence of modern behavior within our clade — a ‘classic’ 
proxy in the field of language evolution, which Johansson has greatly clarified in 
his paper —, the controversy around cultural stasis versus cultural dynamism in 
Neanderthals and AMHs is not so frequently addressed. Johansson marginally 
mentions this: “[T]hroughout most of their existence, Neanderthals used Mous-
terian tools” (Johansson 2013: 20). The important point is not merely that 
complex language seems a key requirement for cultural dynamism in AMHs. It is 
that static and non-static cultures plausibly entail different organizations of 
mind, and particularly, different working memory capacities (Coolidge & Wynn 
2005). Ultimately, more working memory resources could allow more complex 
linguistic structures to be generated (see the discussion in fn. 4). Consequently, if 
only AMH cultures are non-static, some important (for language) cortical reconfi-
guration plausibly occurred only in Homo sapiens, allowing full-fledged language 
to emerge (see Balari et al. 2011 and Balari & Lorenzo 2012 for details). 
 
3. Some remarks on the methodology 
 
Johansson has postulated a concept of ‘proxy’ for language (see his section 2.3). 
The advantage of this conceptual tool is that it is well defined and it constrains 
the possibilities. According to the author, for something to be qualified as a proxy 
for language: 
 
    – It has to be uniquely human: “[A] feature that is shared between humans 
and language-less non-humans is not a useful proxy for language” (Johans-
son 2013: 7). 
    – The absence of the proxy should ideally entail the absence of language: 
“Preferably, the entailment should be two-sided, so that the absence of the 
proxy likewise entails the absence of language” (Johansson, 2013: 7). 
                                                
    12 It would impair visuo-motor tasks demanding implicit learning of sequential stimuli along 
with generating complex motor patterns, such as drawing (Vicari et al. 2005), but also the 
ability for implicit learning of modified artificial grammars (Pavlidou et al. 2010). 
    13 This subcortical area implements a sequencer device in some models of language processing 
(see Lieberman 2000; Ullman 2001; Balari et al. 2011; see also fn. 4). 
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 Johansson correctly advocates as well not relying on just one single proxy 
for inferring either the presence or the absence of language in other species: 
“Instead of relying on any single one, a more prudent approach is to see if there 
is a common pattern to be found among multiple proxy-candidates” (p. 19).  
 That said, we think that Johansson has not followed his own advice till the 
very end. One the one hand, sometimes, we do not see any profound difference 
between his approach and the common search for something that is uniquely 
human and unique in AMH language, like the famous FLN/FLB distinction 
(Hauser et al. 2002).14 But this approach ultimately entails that an AMH language 
is just a hominin language with an extra component. On the other hand, each of 
these proxies, when examined one by one, seemed essentially inconclusive to Jo-
hansson. Nonetheless, it is important to see the picture that emerges when all are 
simultaneously considered. If we consider language as a complex feature, then all 
the elements that play a role therein are important. Paraphrasing Gould & Le-
wontin (1979: 585) language does not seem to be “a collection of discrete objects” 
— in which one of them represents the kernel of language and a completely 
independent entity —, rather “an integrated entity”.  
 Let us illustrate this with an example. From the continued discussion about 
the Neanderthal vocal tract between Philip Lieberman and Louis-Jean Boë,15 we 
can extract at least a relevant aspect from each side:  
 
 a. Cavities and shape of the vocal tract are not enough, but the precise 
control of the organs, such as, for example, the jaw, lips, and tongue. 
 b. The neural substratum for the control and execution of speech is very 
particular in AMHs, involving cortical and subcortical areas, the basal 
ganglia in particular, although similar (i.e., homologue) circuitries are 
observed in other, non-related species (e.g., song birds). 
 
 Both (a) and (b) are connected, and hence both describe part of the reality. 
A modern vocal tract certainly does not entail per se modern language, but 
neither does a human-like neural circuitry. However, a modern vocal tract con-
trolled by a human-like circuitry is plausibly suggestive of modern speech. 
 Summing up, because language is a complex feature intervened by many 
factors, we need to consider all small details in order to enhance our knowledge. 
Ultimately, it is not so much a matter of when a component of language 
appeared, but, above all, of when all the components were put together (i.e. func-
tionally interconnected). And of course, we should also consider the possibility 
that some properties of language are emergent by nature. In other words, they 
                                                
    14 Fitch, one of the proponents of the FLB/FLN distinction, has recently said: 
Given the fact that human cultural capacities themselves rest upon a unique 
biological basis, the debate actually hinges on a distinction between ‘general 
cognitive’ and ‘specifically linguistic’ neural mechanisms in our species. I suggest 
that, from a biological viewpoint, this distinction is unproductive and misleading, 
and that the debates surrounding it have led cognitive science down a blind alley. 
(Fitch 2011: 383). 
    15 For example, Lieberman & Crelin (1971), Boë et al. (1999), Boë et al. (2002), Lieberman (2007), 
Boë et al. (2007), and Lieberman (2012); see also Barney et al. (2012). 
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cannot be predicted from the nature and the interplay of their components at a 
particular level of analysis (see Deacon 2005).  
 
4. A stringent biolinguistic approach to Neanderthal language 
 
We think that a stringent biolinguistic approach to Neanderthal language is actu-
ally possible. An outline of this could be as follows. If our hypothesis is correct, 
all hominin proto-languages (including Neanderthals’) could have been en-
dowed with regular-like grammars (like apes’ ‘languages’) or perhaps with 
context-free-like grammars. Conversely, a fully-fledged modern syntax (which is 
mildly context-sensitive) would have only emerged along with our own species. 
This entails that the Neanderthal-AMH divide would basically consist of a brain 
reconfiguration that improved the computational abilities of the latter. Perhaps, it 
enhanced their working memory, or alternatively, it allowed more efficient 
information exchanges (see Balari & Lorenzo 2012 and Boeckx 2012, respectively, 
for details). But it was this reconfiguration that eventually facilitated the advent 
of modern syntax. 
 In turn, most components of speech were very probably shared both by 
Neanderthals and AHMs — allowing for minor differences.16 The Neanderthal 
interface between this audio-vocal (exteriorizing/interiorizing) system and a 
conceptual system (responsible for thought) could have been firmly established 
as well. As a consequence, an oral, “symbolic communication system that is not 
fixed” (Johansson 2013: 6) in Neanderthals is granted; at the same time, the 
grammar of this language (or protolanguage) would almost certainly have been 
different from that of AHMs’ languages. 
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